IOSCO TechSprint 2026 · Problem Statement 1

AslanX pitch script — final story deck

Speaker notes from the final Google Slides source. Slides 1–13 are the seven-minute pitch, including the two-minute video on slide 9. Slides 14–23 are Q&A backups. The video is silent, so narrate it with the cues below.

7:00 pitch + 3:00 Q&A13 pitch slides + 10 backupsOpen matching deck

Seven-minute pitch

Slide 1 — Did you know how widespread investment scams are?

01 / 230:00–0:30

"Across forty-two markets, nearly half of the people who had encountered a scam reported an investment scam. In Southeast Asia alone, estimated losses reached twenty-four billion US dollars in a year. An investor usually sees just one offer at a time. The question is whether they can check it before they pay."

GASA surveyed 46,000 adults across 42 markets. The 48% denominator is scam victims, not all adults. US$24B applies only to Southeast Asia over twelve months. The globe is a composite illustration of a typical cross-border scam network — no real firm named. Sources: https://gasa.org/knowledge-base/blog/global-scams-on-the-rise-over-half-of-adults-worldwide-report-scam-encounters ; https://gasa.org/knowledge-base/blog/anatomy-of-an-investment/crypto-scam

Slide 2 — AI can copy the signals of trust. Who connects the clues?

02 / 230:30–0:55

"A name, a logo and a licence number can all look familiar. But are they attached to the same authorised firm? The website, contact details and payment destination have to match. A company listing alone cannot tell an investor that."

The pattern illustrates perceived authority and urgency. FCA clone-firm guidance: https://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/clone-firms-individuals

Slide 3 — A real company number. A false licence claim.

03 / 230:55–1:25

"Look at the number on this card: 16523636. It belongs to a company registered in the UK, but it is presented here as if it were an FCA licence. QRS is one of four brokers in a Thai DSI investigation that has drawn reports of more than seventeen billion baht in losses — over five hundred million US dollars. A convincing number can be the wrong kind of number."

DSI describes individual QRS losses from hundreds of thousands to tens of millions of baht, but no QRS-only aggregate. THB833M in some coverage concerns a disputed money flow, not verified victim losses. Bank of Thailand USD reference rate on 24 Sep 2026 was THB33.426: https://app.bot.or.th/BTWS_STAT/statistics/ReportPage.aspx?language=eng&reportID=123. A$35.9M is a court claim across 95 Australian companies, QRS among them (https://download.asic.gov.au/media/jllce4ou/25-052mr-asic-v-24-u-pty-ltd-fca-321-judgment.pdf). The card carries a WikiFX seal; describe it as "displayed," not "forged." Sources: https://www.dsi.go.th/th/Detail/4ac5053b13833474453f6fbed458f6f8 ; https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/16523636 ; https://market.sec.or.th/public/idisc/th/Viewmore/invalert-det?CaseID=1388&CaseYY=2567

Slide 4 — AslanX

04 / 231:25–1:40

"That is why we built AslanX. Paste the offer you have in front of you. We check the firm and the claim, show what the official record says, and explain what to do before paying."

Let the product name land after the problem and the QRS evidence.

Slide 5 — Paste the offer. See what does not match.

05 / 231:40–2:05

"An investor can paste the message or link they received, even if it mixes Thai and English. AslanX checks any claimed FCA authorisation against the register, then shows the exact mismatch and the source. They can make a decision before sending money or personal details."

The investor flow is available at aslanx.uk and requires no account. Point to the paste box in the screenshot.

Slide 6 — Four AI specialists. One evidence trail.

06 / 232:05–2:30

"Four specialist roles work through the offer. Scout reads the claim. Trace maps the names, sites and contact points. Lex checks a claimed UK licence against the FCA Register. Sentinel brings the risk score, the exact phrases and the official result into one case file. The flow screens ten investment-fraud patterns, from cloned firms to recovery scams."

Scout, Trace, Lex and Sentinel are coordinated roles in the current product workflow, backed by Gemini analysis, live FCA retrieval and a deterministic register risk floor. They are not four separately deployed autonomous LLM agents. The ten patterns are listed in the investor UI, not a measured detection-accuracy claim.

Slide 7 — Trace the score back to the evidence.

07 / 232:30–2:50

"The score is a starting point. We keep the original words, extract the firm and contact details, check UK licence claims against the FCA Register, and show the flags and source results together in a case file. An investigator can see what triggered the finding and follow the official check."

The entity graph is generated from the offer and analysis, so its links are leads for review, not independently verified relationships. Source documents are attached to the curated QRS record; generic analysis does not yet match cases worldwide or attach equivalent source-document bundles. The QRS record cites DSI and Australian court material separately.

Slide 8 — Adapt the check to local language and sources.

08 / 232:50–3:10

"People should not need a registration number to ask whether an offer is safe. A name, message or link is enough to start. Mixed Thai and English work now. For other markets, we need to connect the local records, review the language and test the results before claiming coverage."

Three paths have been demonstrated end to end: fake licence, clone firm and recovery scam. Other jurisdictions and languages need measured validation.

Slide 9 — Watch an investor check a QRS offer.

09 / 233:10–5:10 / PLAY THE VIDEO

[0:00–0:20] "The investor starts with the message they received. AslanX shows what it checks, and there is no account to create."

[0:20–0:40] "Here we paste QRS promotional text, then ask about the firm in Thai. The check starts from what the investor has, with no licence number required."

[0:40–1:00] "The result is high risk, ninety-six out of one hundred. This is labelled a verified case record, not a fresh live check. The recorded FCA Register check found no match for the claimed licence."

[1:00–1:20] "The connections view links the claim to entities and official findings. The case file puts the chronology beside the source documents so a reviewer can follow each finding."

[1:20–1:40] "The globe shows where the case crosses borders. The flow view shows why an early warning matters: the withdrawal gate can stop investors getting their money back."

[1:40–1:59] "The last screen sketches a community-reporting view. The on-site form does not yet store submissions; the figures on the next slide are a separate team-confirmed snapshot."

The web deck embeds the silent 1:59 demo. Press Play at 3:10 and narrate with the cues above. The Google Slides source still needs its separate demo video attached before presenting there.

Slide 10 — We brought AslanX to a 20K+ member community.

10 / 235:10–5:30

"We introduced AslanX through local communities with more than twenty thousand members. People tried the platform, gave us feedback and reported what happened to them in the QRS case. That outreach brought in 127 people and 143 loss reports. Those reports helped us improve the product and assemble a case record for review."

The AslanX team confirmed 127 people and 143 reports on 1 Oct 2026. The 20K+ figure is the reported size of a community where AslanX was distributed, not verified reach or usage. The current on-site form does not persist new submissions; the team supplied the count snapshot. A platform-reported aggregate loss amount has not been provided, so this slide shows reports rather than a money total.

Slide 11 — Work with regulators on earlier warnings.

11 / 235:30–5:55

"We want to start with the case in Thailand. Regulators and investigators can review the QRS file and tell us what evidence they need. Then we can connect local registers and public warnings in other markets. With banks and platforms, we can test whether a warning shown before a payment changes what an investor does."

No Thai authority, IOSCO member, bank or platform has agreed a pilot or integration. IOSCO jurisdiction count: https://www.iosco.org/. I-SCAN API and bank example: https://www.iosco.org/library/speeches/pdf/20251120-Rodrigo-Buenaventura.pdf. Thai SEC QRS alert: https://market.sec.or.th/public/idisc/th/Viewmore/invalert-det?CaseID=1388&CaseYY=2567. DSI case: https://www.dsi.go.th/th/Detail/4ac5053b13833474453f6fbed458f6f8

Slide 12 — Add official sources market by market.

12 / 235:55–6:15

"The FCA Register is connected now. QRS also crosses Thai and Australian records, so those are sensible next sources to explore with regulators. Each market needs its own records, language review and guidance. For the investor, the experience stays simple: paste the offer and see the source behind the warning."

The white dots reproduce the older AslanX IOSCO ordinary-member map snapshot; they are geography, not live integrations. FCA Register is live. Thai SEC and ASIC adapters are proposed. IOSCO membership and I-SCAN source: https://www.iosco.org/ ; https://www.iosco.org/library/speeches/pdf/20251120-Rodrigo-Buenaventura.pdf

Slide 13 — Put the warning before the transfer.

13 / 236:15–6:45

"We are asking for a regulator pilot. Review the QRS evidence file with us, connect an official local source, and test whether investors stop to check before they send money. If the evidence shows it helps, we can expand the approach to other markets. Thank you."

Allow 15 seconds for the video transition, slide changes or room response within the 7:00 slot.

Q&A backup slides

Slide 14 — Every big number has a defined scope

14 / 23 · Q&A backupQ&A only

GASA surveyed 46,000 adults in 42 markets; 48% is of scam victims. US$24B is Southeast Asia over twelve months. US$8.65B is FBI IC3 2025 US reports. DSI reported more than THB17B of losses across four brokers including QRS, or more than US$500M at approximately THB33.5 per dollar; it did not publish a QRS-only total. A$35.9M is the ASIC v 24-U Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 321 claim total for 95 companies. At the RBA rate on 24 Sep 2026 (0.7032 USD/AUD), that is US$25.2M.

Sources: GASA/Feedzai 2025 · FBI IC3 2025 · DSI 92/2569 · ASIC v 24-U · https://www.rba.gov.au/statistics/frequency/exchange-rates.html

Slide 15 — What an investor sees in Expert mode.

15 / 23 · Q&A backupDemo backup

If the video fails, walk the four areas here instead — or run the QRS sample chip live.

Slide 16 — The records behind the pitch figures

16 / 23 · Q&A backupQ&A only

Every link is independently checkable. IOSCO online-harm scope: https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD752.pdf

Slide 17 — Assets found: 0.09% of claims.

17 / 23 · Q&A backupQ&A only

ASIC v 24-U Pty Ltd [2025] FCA 321 records A$35,881,288 in claims across nearly 1,500 investors against 95 companies, QRS Global Pty Ltd among them, and A$33,018 in identified assets. 33,018 / 35,881,288 = 0.092%; this is an assets-to-claims ratio, not a recovery rate or QRS-specific figure.

https://download.asic.gov.au/media/jllce4ou/25-052mr-asic-v-24-u-pty-ltd-fca-321-judgment.pdf

Slide 18 — One case record spans five countries.

18 / 23 · Q&A backupQ&A only

The AslanX QRS case object contains 14 nodes, 15 links and locations in five countries. These are graph records, not 14 adjudicated legal entities or 15 proven illicit transfers. This slide shows why the evidence needs an end-to-end case view.

App source: src/lib/qrsCase.js ; official references: https://www.dsi.go.th/th/Detail/4ac5053b13833474453f6fbed458f6f8 ; https://download.asic.gov.au/media/jllce4ou/25-052mr-asic-v-24-u-pty-ltd-fca-321-judgment.pdf ; https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/16523636

Slide 19 — Four examples test different decisions.

19 / 23 · Q&A backupQ&A only

These are four selected scores captured in the 26 Sep 2026 demo, not an accuracy benchmark. QRS is the cached case record; the other examples were run live. A regulator pilot should use labelled positives and negatives, measure false positives and false negatives, and repeat runs across languages and markets.

Demo inputs and QRS case record are available in the AslanX app.

Slide 20 — The number was real. The authority was not.

20 / 23 · Q&A backupQ&A only

The trap is a valid company number presented as a financial licence. The product now starts a firm-name check from plain or mixed-language text without asking the investor for a registration number. The timeline distinguishes the 95-company ASIC case and four-broker DSI case from QRS-only claims.

Sources are linked per event.

Slide 21 — Each market needs sources, testing and reach.

21 / 23 · Q&A backupQ&A only

FCA checks are connected now. I-SCAN and other member sources, formal pilots and distribution remain future work; each jurisdiction needs source mapping, language review and outcome testing.

IOSCO I-SCAN: https://www.iosco.org/library/speeches/pdf/20251120-Rodrigo-Buenaventura.pdf

Slide 22 — A document is not the authority it implies.

22 / 23 · Q&A backupQ&A only

The Mohéli document purports to be an offshore brokerage licence. The relevant question for Thai investors is whether the entity was authorised to solicit them in Thailand; Thai SEC and DSI say QRS was not. Describe the FCA card as displayed, not proven forged by QRS.

https://market.sec.or.th/public/idisc/th/Viewmore/invalert-det?CaseID=1388&CaseYY=2567 ; https://www.dsi.go.th/th/Detail/4ac5053b13833474453f6fbed458f6f8 ; https://register.fca.org.uk/ ; https://find-and-update.company-information.service.gov.uk/company/16523636

Slide 23 — Put AslanX on the pages investors already use.

23 / 23 · Q&A backupQ&A only

The original slide suggested investor education and warning-list pages. IOSCO has also described I-SCAN use by banks before transfers and by platform providers to warn or block offers. No such AslanX partnership exists yet.

https://www.iosco.org/library/speeches/pdf/20251120-Rodrigo-Buenaventura.pdf ; https://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD797.pdf